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Abstract
Certified labeling for credence attributes is examined using the concepts of pooled and separating equilibria.
Credence attributes are product features that cannot be experienced directly by consumer, features such as
pesticide-free, dolphin-safe, hormone-free, and organic.  Without labeling, the traded good is a mix of credence
and conventional goods.  With certified labeling, the pooled market is replaced with separate markets for the
credence and conventional good.  Market outcomes are examined theoretically and with empirical simulations.
Costless labeling is net welfare improving, but impacts are highly asymmetric.  Credence producers gain largely
at the expense of conventional producers.  Costly labeling may reduce welfare even with rather modest labeling
costs.
August 18, 20031
Information as a Double-Edged Sword: The Economic and Welfare Consequences of Certified
Labeling for Credence Attributes
Public agencies are under pressure to certify food labels for non-nutritional, credence attributes (Golan,
et al., 2001). Credence attributes are product features that cannot be directly experienced by consumers.  High
costs make individually financed detection of credence attributes uneconomic (Darby and Karni, 1973).
Notable examples of credence attributes include dolphin-safe tuna (Teisl, et al., 2002) and the National Organic
Program (Agricultural Marketing Service, 2003b).   Other examples include origin labeling (Agricultural
Marketing Service, 2003a), absence of pesticide residues (Ott, et al., 1991), genetically modified content
(Caswell, 1998, Zedalis, 2001), and hormone-free labeling (Kleiner).  In this article, we develop a market-level
model to evaluate the economic and welfare consequences of labeling.
Labels that identify credence attributes are often viewed as a means to ensure the provision of valued
attributes and thereby avoid market failure (Crespi and Marette, 2001). Without credence labeling, consumers
are unable to identify whether a product has a desired credence attribute.  A conventional product without the
credence attribute appears to be a perfect substitute for the credence good.  In terms of the consumers direct
experience, the conventional and credence goods are indistinguishable without labeling.  
Crespi and Maretee (2001) suggest that a market failure results from an absence of credence labeling.
Market price fails to register a willingness to pay premium for the credence good and lower-cost conventional
firms drive higher-cost credence good firms out of the market.  As a result, markets fail to provide the credence
good.  Certified labeling resolves the informational asymmetry and improves efficiency (Crespi and Marette,
2001). Certified labeling distinguishes products by their credence attribute, allowing separate markets to
emerge for both credence and conventional goods.   Certification by governmental agencies improves the
uniformity and reliability of labeling, thereby supporting the accurate valuation of differentiated products
(Golan, et al., 2001). 2
Recent analysis raises doubts about the incentives and efficiency of credence labeling.  First, certified
labeling may not support a price premium for credence goods.  Post-labeling prices may be higher, but equal,
for both high- and low-credence sectors when there is excess high-credence supply relative to high-credence
demand (Sedjo and Swallow, 2002).   
Second, the stark market breakdown where high-credence firms are driven from the market does not
seem occur.  Some firms meet certifications standards even without labeling (Sedjo and Swallow, 2002).  This
absence of stark market failure seems particularly relevant to agriculture where more than a third of retail fruits
and vegetables are pesticide-free (Agricultural Marketing Service, 2001), two-thirds of corn production in the
United States uses seeds that are not genetically engineered (National Agricultural Statistics Service, 2002),
and sixty-five percent of dairy cows produce milk without the use growth hormones (Barham and Foltz, 2002).
The market failure of zero credence goods appears to be the wrong baseline for assessing efficiency gains.  
Finally, information economics cautions against assuming that more information is better.  Asymmetric
information produces asymmetric gains from information (Stiglitz, 2002).  Individual agents may have a strong
self-interest to invest in inefficient signals (Spence, 1973).
Our analysis of labeling develops a mathematical, market-level model to examine the price and welfare
consequences of certified labeling.  Without labeling, the credence and conventional goods are perfect
substitutes.  Credence and conventional firms coexist in the initial, pooled equilibrium, since each subsector
is an increasing cost industry.   Consumers view the pooled product as a mixed good, and have a conjecture
about the proportion of the high-credence attribute provided by the mixed good.  Once certified labeling is
introduced, credence and conventional goods separate into two distinct markets, one for each pure good.
Consumers sort themselves across the markets for the two goods.  The sorting decision is endogenous to the
markets.  Each consumer consumes either the credence good or conventional good to maximize net surplus,
the difference between one’s reservation price and market price for each product. 3
The analysis examines the price, quantity, and welfare consequences of labeling. We derive both the
general properties of the equilibria and subsequent welfare effects.  Costless labeling improves the welfare, but
the incidence of benefits and costs is highly asymmetric.  Unless market saturation occurs, certified credence
producers are certain to gain and conventional producers are certain to lose.  In our simulations, the net gain
is small relative to the distribution effects across conventional and credence producers.  In this sense, labeling
is a double edged sword, resulting in sizable benefits for some producers and definite losses for others.  With
costly labeling, the asymmetry of gains and losses may create a Spence-like result where credence producers
have an incentive to press for certified labeling even when labeling is Pareto inefficient relative to the pooled
equilibrium.
The analysis is developed in the following manner.  The second section describes the demand and
supply conditions underlying the pooled and separating equilibria.  The third section derives the price and
quantity characteristics of the two equilibrium as well as equations for measuring the welfare effects of certified
labeling.  The fourth section presents market and welfare simulations for a range of initial demand and supply
conditions.  The final section suggests further research.  
Demand, Supply, and Market Equilibria
Certified labeling is examined using the concepts of pooled and separating equilibria.  Without labeling,
conventional and credence goods are indistinguishable, so prices and quantities are determined by a pooled
market equilibrium.  Certified labeling distinguish the conventional from the credence good, and the single
pooled market separates into two subsector markets, each with the potential for determining distinct prices and
quantities.  The markets described are composed of many suppliers and demanders.  The intent is to reflect the
market conditions of major agricultural food products such as fruits, vegetables, and grains.  
This section describes the market components and derives both the pooled and separating equilibria.
The markets are composed of firms producing the conventional good, firms producing the credence good, and
consumers.  The conventional and credence sectors have different cost structures, but each is an increasing cost4
qc ' β0 & β2rc
' qc(rc)
(1)
rc ' γ0 & γ2qc
' rc(qc)
(2)
industry.  Increasing costs may arise from an input supplied inelastically, such as land, dairy herd size, or
climate.  Credence firms have a cost advantage in using the fixed input under certain conditions, while low-
credence firms may be cost advantaged by different conditions.  For example, fruit producers in arid climates
may have an advantage in producing fungicide-free fruits, while fungicide-using firms may be more cost
advantaged by humid climates.  Consumers are represented by aggregate demands for conventional, credence,
and  mixed goods.  As in empirical studies, unconditional conventional and credence demands differ by a
constant that represents the willingness to pay premium for the credence good (Blend and van Ravenswaay,
1999, Ott, et al., 1991).
The unconditional aggregate demand for the conventional good is the quantity demanded at a given
price when the credence good is not available,
where  is the quantity of the conventional good,  ,  is the price of the conventional good, and qc β0, β1 >0rc
indicates that the conventional quantity demanded is a function of conventional price.  Equation (1)  is qc(rc)
an unconditional demand since it does not allow for the market availability of the green product.  The
conditional demands are derived below.   
The unconditional reservation price schedule for the conventional good is the mathematical inverse of
equation (1).  The reservation price schedule describes the maximum price that demanders are willing to pay
for a specified quantity of the conventional good.  It is,5
qg ' β0 % β1 & β2rg
' qg(rg)
(3)
rg ' γ0 % γ1 & γ2qg
' rg(qg)
(4)
where  ,  , and   represents reservation price as a function of quantity.  γ0 ' β0/β1 γ2 ' 1/β1 rc(qc)
The credence good is referred to as the green product.  The unconditional aggregate demand for the
green product is 
where  for   and    for  .  The quantity   is the threshold in sales of where the β1 >0 qg # q
(





demand premium vanishes and the high valued demand shifts to the conventional demand. The threshold
condition incorporates the Sedjo and Swallow (2002) characterization of a market composed of limited demand
for the green product where only a subset of consumers who care about the perceived difference between the
green and conventional products.  Since limited demand is  only interesting in the case of the labeled market,
it will be assumed that the quantity of product exchanged is less than the threshold,  , unless stated otherwise. q
(
g
Analogous to equation (2), the market reservation price schedule for the green product is
where   for   and    for  . As shown in equations (2) and (4), γ1 ' β1/β2 >0 qg # q
(
g γ1 ' 0 qg > q
(
g
conventional and high value reservation price loci differ only by a fixed intercept shifter,  .  The  latter shifter γ1
is the willingness to pay premium for the green product.6
mcc ' µ0 % µ1qc (5)
mcg ' δ0 % δ1qg % τ (6)
mc ' φ0 % φ1Q
' mc(Q)
(7)
Within each sector, production functions at the firm-level are constant returns to scale.  Inelastic input
supply results in increasing sector costs.  The relationship between firm-level marginal costs and the quantity
supplied by the conventional sector is,
where  is a fixed component and   is the slope of marginal costs within the conventional sector with µ0>0 µ1>0
respect to sector output.  Equation (5) is the conventional product supply function.
The relationship between marginal cost and the quantity supplied by the green sector is 
where   is a fixed component,  the slope of marginal cost in market share, and   is a fixed per unit δ0>0 δ1>0 τ
cost of labeling in the separating equilibrium.  Labeling costs are zero in the pooled equilibrium and separating
equilibrium with costless labeling described below, so  in these cases.   In a separating equilibrium with τ ' 0
costly labeling, the green industry incurs a certification cost and  .  τ>0
In an unlabeled market, demanders are unable to distinguish the conventional product from the green
product, so separate conventional and green price signals do not emerge and there is a single pooled market for
both types of goods.  Aggregate supply in this market is the horizontal summation of each sector’s marginal
costs,7
Qα ' (1&α)qc % αqg
' β0 % αβ1 & β2rα
' Qα(rα)
(8)
where  ,  ,  , and  ,  .  Note Q ' qc % qg φ0 '





mc(Q) ' mcj(qj) j ' {c,g}
that per unit labeling costs shift the intercept of the aggregate marginal cost curve.
A Pooled Equilibrium
Demanders in a pooled market are unable to match their willingness to pay to a pure conventional or
pure green product.  Rather, they purchase a mixed product.  The mix exists  because conventional and green
producers are competitive even prior to labels.  The relative mix of conventional and green product depends
on the market equilibrium conditions.  
In the pooled equilibrium demanders are not able to identify products by the presence or absence of
a credence attribute.  However, because a mix of conventional and green products exists, consumers formulate
a conjecture about the proportions of conventional and green products contained in the mix.  The conjectured
proportion of green product in the market mix is ,  .  In the pooled market, market demand is α 0<α<1
conditioned on the conjecture.  Demand is a  -weighted sum of the unconditional conventional and green α
demands,
Demanders conjecture that the market mix contains 100  percent of the green product.  The reservation price α
schedule for the conjectured market mixture is the inverse of line (2) of equation (8),8






























The actual mix in the market is not restricted by the -weighting.  α
A pooled equilibrium equates quantity supplied with quantity demanded at a single market price. 
Consumers perceive the   -mixture, the total market quantity,  , is the sum of the conventional and green α Q
quantities,  .  The conjecture may be wrong so that the market mix is over- or under-valued.  The Q ' qc % qg
only restriction at the market level is that the market clears, so that aggregate quantity demanded,  , equals Qα
aggregate quantity supplied,  .  Thus, the mixed, unlabeled competitive market equilibrium is a Q ' qc % qg
single pooled market price,  , that clears the market given the  -conjecture and firms earn zero profit, p
p
α α
where, for simplicity of notation,  the conditionality of the equilibrium quantities is left implicit.  In terms of
aggregate supply, the pooled equilibrium conditions are 9
˜ qc ' qc(rc) & qc(pg)
' β2pg & β2rc
' ˜ qc(rc*pg)
(12)





Equations (10) and (11) define a pooled market equilibrium using, respectively, subsector supply conditions
and aggregate supply conditions.  The pooled equilibrium conditions provide the baseline conditions for
evaluating the economic and welfare consequences of certified labeling .
A Separating Equilibrium with Certified Labeling
Once certified labeling is introduced, buyers can identify the green product from the conventional
product.  Certified labeling permits buyers the choice between two pure products, the conventional and the
green product.  Demands may be conditional on the availability of the related product, in the sense that once
a buyer purchases a unit of the green product, demand for that unit is lost to conventional market.  Demand
for the conventional product in a labeled market is a conditional, residual demand.
1
Residual demand is the unconditional demand for the conventional product, equation (3), minus
purchases of the green product at the prices prevailing in the labeled situation,
where  is the green product price prevailing in an labeled market. The residual reservation price schedule is pg
























One approach to defining a separating equilibrium with certified labeling is to set quantities demanded
so that prices are equal to marginal costs in separate conventional and green markets.  In this situation, the
equilibrium conditions are
where the superscript i indicates prices and quantities pertaining to the proposed equilibrium.  The problem
with equations (15) is that they cannot describe an equilibrium.  There is at least one green consumer who
would gain surplus by shifting consumer to the conventional product.  





This consumer obtains no consumer surplus from the green product since the consumer’s reservation price,
, is just equal to market price at this marginal unit. But this marginal high value consumer is a infra- rg(q
i
g)
marginal consumer in the conventional market; this individual would have the highest reservation price in the













































Green product consumers take into account the opportunity cost of foregoing consumption of the
conventional product.  Consumers in the conventional market also take into account their opportunity cost.
The marginal green consumer is only content to remain in the high value market as long as the net surplus from
consumption, reservation prices less market price, is greater or equal to the surplus forgone by purchasing the
conventional product.  The infra-marginal conventional consumers obtains net surplus that is also great or
equal to the opportunity in the green market.
2  
In a labeled equilibrium, net surplus for marginal high value consumer is equal to net surplus for the
first incremental quantity of the conventional product.  The equilibrium conditions are,
where the first line of equations (15) is the net surplus condition that ensures consumers maximize the surplus
obtained from their purchases.  The second line of equation (15) requires the green market to clear at a price
where the marginal product earns zero rent.  The third and fourth lines of equations (15) set prices and
quantities so that the conventional markets clear where price equals marginal costs.
Price, Quantity, and Welfare Effects of Labeling
This section examines the price, quantity, and welfare effects of labeling.  We first examine  the special
case to compare the basic properties of the two equilibria.  A general comparison of prices and quantities is
then derived mathematically.  We  consider cases with and without market saturation.  The final segment
describes the welfare effects of labeling.12
Figure 1 describes the supply and demand conditions that support both a pooled equilibrium and a
separating equilibrium with labeling.  The aggregate pooled reservation price schedule,  , is the alpha- rα
weighted combination of the unconditional conventional schedule,  , and the unconditional green schedule, rc
.   Figure 1 is a special case where the conventional supply is perfectly elastic, while the green supply is rg
inelastic.  The green subsector also has a cost advantage from zero to  , but the conventional subsector has q
p
g
the cost advantage for market quantities greater than  .  The aggregate supply function is therefore the lower q
p
g
frontier of the subsector supply curves:  for quantities less than  and  thereafter.  If  were greater mcg q
p
g mcc δ0
than  , no green firm would persist in the pooled equilibrium. In this analysis, cost structures are such that µ0
both subsectors are competitive  in the initial equilibrium, consistent with the stylized facts of agricultural
products cited above.
Price and quantity in the pooled equilibrium are determined by the pooled, alpha-weighted reservation
price and aggregate supply.  The pooled reservation price schedule meets aggregate supply where the
reservation price equals  , so the pooled equilibrium price,  , equals  , and the aggregate equilibrium µ0 p
p
α µ0
quantity is  .  The quantity produced by the green and conventional subsectors equates the marginal costs Q
p
α
of each subsector with the pooled price, so the green subsector produces   and the conventional subsector q
p
g
produces .    q
p
c ' Q p & q
p
g
The pooled equilibrium is conditioned on the conjecture  , so a different conjecture would result in α
a different pooled equilibrium.  For instance, if the conjecture were zero, the pooled price and quantity would
be consistent with point e in Figure 1.  If the conjecture were one, the pooled price and quantity would be13
consistent with point g.  At this point, the conjecture is assumed to equal the green market share.   The welfare
consequences of an incorrect conjecture are considered at the end of this section. 
Prices and quantities in the separating equilibrium with labeling are determining the subsector supplies,
the green reservation price schedule, and the conditional conventional reservation price schedule. The
equilibrium green quantity,   is determined by the point where the net surplus of  consuming a unit of the q
s
g
green product is equal to the net surplus of consuming a unit of conventional product.  Since green firms behave
competitively, the equilibrium green price,  , is equal to marginal sector costs at the equilibrium quantity. p
s
g
   The separating equilibrium quantity of conventional product is determined by the point where the
conditional conventional reservation price schedule is equal to the conventional subsector supply cure.  The
latter is point e in Figure 1, so that the conventional quantity in the separating equilibrium is   and the q
s
c




Comparison of the pooled and separating equilibrium in Figure 1 illustrates several important points.
First, when the market is not saturated, a green price premium emerges in the separating equilibrium with
labeling.  Notably, with a perfectly elastic conventional supply, the price premium emerges that is exactly equal
to the willingness to pay premium for the green good,  .





is a double-edged sword that defines both the green product and its complement, the conventional product, for
consumers.  What was a single market for a mixed good becomes two separate markets for two pure goods,
one with the credence attribute and the one without.  The economic consequence is that the green good is higher
in value, and the conventional good lower (weak inequality) in value to demanders than the mixed good
produced in the pooled equilibrium.14
Third, the change from mixed to pure products affects the equilibrium quantities of both the green and



















conventional supply, the aggregate quantity may rise or fall.
The consequences for the green and conventional quantities are general to the defined pooled and
separating equilibria, resulting in the following theorem:
4
Theorem 1:
3.  Let certified labeling costs be less than willingness to pay,  , and let the green quantity τ < γ1





separating equilibrium with labeling is greater than green quantity supplied in the pooled equilibrium.  The
conventional quantity supplied in the separating equilibrium is less to the conventional quantity supplied in the
pooled equilibrium  
Figure 1 suggests that the price premium for the green product is equal to the willingness to premium,
, and Theorem 2 generalizes this result.  Importantly for price analysis, however, this equilibrium price γ1
premium is not the difference between the green price with labeling and the pooled price.
Theorem 2:
3  Let certified labeling costs be less than willingness to pay,  , and let the labeled γ1 > τ






a. The price premium for the green product relative to the conventional product in the labeled





b. The conventional price in the separating equilibrium is less or equal to the pooled equilibrium
price and the green price in the separating equilibrium is greater than the pooled equilibrium
price. 
c. The difference between the green price in the separating equilibrium and the pooled price is
less than or equal to per unit willingness to pay for the credence attribute.  The equality holds
only when the conventional supply is perfectly elastic. 
Theorem 2 clarifies the nature of a price premium in the separating equilibrium.  The price premium is a
difference that arises within a separating equilibrium, not across the separating and pooled equilibria.  In policy
analyses of labeling, potential certified producers may want to know the price increase that they may expect.
This potential price increase across cannot be determined by merely knowing willingness to pay.  The price
increase that producers may get from labeling  is the difference between the green price in the separating
equilibrium and the pooled price.  This across-equilibria price increase is determined only in part by willingness
to pay.  Other market parameters also influence the potential price increase, parameters such as the elasticities
of demand, green supply, and conventional supply.  Willingness to pay alone is informative only is the special
case of perfectly elastic conventional supply.  In the inelastic case, the across-equilibria price premium and
discount can only be determining by solving for the separating equilibrium prices and quantities and comparing
these with the initial pooled equilibria.
The discussion has assumed to this point that demand for the green good is sufficient generate a
willingness to pay premium for the quantity of green product supplied in the separating equilibrium.  This may
not be the case.  The green market may become saturated, with the excess being sold in the conventional sector.
Theorem 3 addresses this case.
Theorem 3:
3 Let certified labeling costs be less than willingness to pay,  , and let the green quantity γ1 > τ











a. With costless certification and labeling, prices and quantities are unchanged across the pooled
and separating equilibria with labeling.
b. With costly certification and labeling, 
i. The aggregate quantity of green and conventional products is less in the separating
equilibrium with labeling than in the pooled equilibrium,
ii. The conventional market share and quantity are greater, and the green market share
and quantity are less, in the separating equilibrium relative to the pooled equilibrium.
iii. The single separating equilibrium price,  , is greater than the pooled equilibrium p s
price, but the price difference between equilibria is less than the per unit labeling cost
increase for green producers,  . τ > p s & p
p
α
With market saturation, costly certification appears to reduce the economic surpluses in the green subsector.
Green production costs rise, but the green price increase is less than the increase in per unit certification and
labeling costs.  The single equilibrium price is higher so conventional consumers lose, while conventional
producers gain.  Conventional producers gain due both to a higher market price and greater  market share. This
unexpected distribution of benefits and costs is examined in more detail in the empirical simulation below.
The price and quantity changes described by the theorems are central to understanding the welfare
effects of certified labeling.  Table 1 lists welfare differences between the separating equilibrium with certified
labeling and the pooled equilibrium.  The equations are derived for a separating equilibrium where saturation
does not occur.    Producer surplus is defined by the  area between the price line and sector marginal costs.17
The change in producer welfare across the equilibria is the producer surplus associated with the separating
equilibrium minus the producer surplus associated with the pooled equilibrium.  
Consumer surplus is the positive area between a demand curve and a price line for a given quantity.
The change in green consumer surplus is the difference between consumer surplus in the market for the green
product in the separating equilibrium minus the surplus obtaining for the sample units of the mixed product
in the pooled equilibrium. Conventional consumer surplus is the consumer surplus associated with the







The difference between the latter surplus measures is the change in conventional surplus.  
The welfare differences in the green sector are influenced by the change in green price relative to the
pooled price, the change in consumer willingness to pay, and the unit cost of certified labeling.  The change in
green price is, in turn, equal to the marginal cost slope parameter,  , times the change in green quantities, δ1





willingness to pay is greater than certified labeling cost, Theorem 1 holds and the change in availability is
positive.  In the latter case, green producer surplus is strictly positive.  The implied price increase, however,
makes consumers worse off.  Consumers surplus is also reduced by the total certification cost, but increases
by net willingness to pay for the pure product.  Net willingness to pay for the pure green product is reduced
by one minus consumers’  conjecture about the mixed product.  The larger, the more green, the mixed product
conjecture, the smaller is the consumers’ gain from certified labeling.  The net effect of labeling for green
consumers may be positive or negative.  In the green market as a whole, the same ambiguity holds since the
net market effect may be positive or negative.  Only green production is certain to gain.  
The change in conventional producer surplus is composed of two terms in Table 1.  The second term





negative when Theorem 1 holds.  Thus, conventional production is certain to sustain a loss with certified
labeling.  The reservation price schedule the conventional product shifts down relative to the mixed good, and
conventional price declines, with a concomitant decline in conventional producer surplus.
The effect of labeling on consumers of the conventional product in the separating equilibrium is
unclear.  If the aggregate quantity of product sales expands in the separating equilibrium relative to the pooled
case, the first term in the welfare change equation is positive, but it is not clear whether the positive term is
large enough to offset the two negative terms.  If aggregate sales decline,  conventional consumers are certain
to be worse off with labeling.
The qualitative results of Table 1 leave the aggregate effects of labeling unclear.  Green producer
surplus is definitely positive under the conditions of Theorem 1, and conventional producer surplus is certain
to be negative.  The impact of labeling on consumers, however, may be positive or negative.  Conventional
consumer surplus is certain to be negative only when aggregate sales decline with labeling.  The net effect of
these welfare impacts is unclear, leaving the aggregate welfare effect of labeling to quantitative analysis.
Market Simulations
Numeral simulations were carried out to characterize the quantitative changes that may arise with certified
labeling.  Two sets of simulations were generated.  The first set examined the price, quantity, and welfare
effects of labeling without market saturation.  Regression analysis was used to examine how parameters such
as initial pooled price, demand elasticity, and supply elasticities affected the welfare differences across the
pooled and separating equilibria. The second examined the same effects with green market saturation. 
Labeling in Without Market Saturation
The initial step in simulations was to identify a set of parameters that are representative of major agricultural
markets.  Parameters ranges were obtained from the existing research and policy literature.   Eight thousands
different combinations of parameter values  were obtained by selecting from each range randomly, using a
psuedo-random uniform distribution for each parameter.  Each of the 8,000 sets of parameter values were used19
to compute quantities, prices, and surpluses for the pooled and separating equilibrium.  Two different sets of
separating equilibria were generated, the first for costless labeling where labeling costs were reset to zero and
the second with costly labeling where labeling costs were left at their randomly selected levels.  
Initial pooled price and quantity parameters were selected to represent the range of prices and
quantities found in wholesale markets for the five largest non-citrus fruit crops in the United States.  These
crops, in order of quantities sold, are apples, grapes, strawberries, peaches, and pears (Economic Research
Service, 2003).  Table 2 shows the annual quantity of sales for these five crops range from 547 to 2,771
thousand tons in 2001.  Price per ton varies from $364 to $1,514 per ton.  
Conjectures were set equal to green market share in the initial, pooled equilibrium.
5  Initial conditions
for green market shares were selected to represent the variation in initial conditions found in agricultural
markets.  The lower endpoint was 2 percent and was based on the market share of organic produce prior to the
organic program (Greene, 2001).  The upper endpoint was 40 percent and reflected the approximate quantity
of non-genetically engineering corn grown in the United States. 
  Demand parameters were based on research literature (Brown and Lee, 2002, Huang and Lin, 2000,
You, et al., 1998).  The demand elasticity range was based on econometric research showing that recent fruit
and vegetable elasticity estimates varied from just less than -.3 to a little over -1.1.  The formula for price
elasticity was used to calculate the slope of reservation price schedule for randomly drawn combination of
demand elasticity, price, and quantity.  Willingness to pay values were selected to incorporate mean estimates,
as well as to examine the somewhat higher willingness to pay values that may be found in limited segments of
a market (Blend and van Ravenswaay, 1999, Buzby, et al., 1995, Hammitt, 1990, Ott, et al., 1991).
Little guidance was available in the literature regarding supply elasticities and the cost of certified
labeling.  The supply elasticity range was selected to mirror the range for the demand elasticities, as well as
including judgements by other researchers (National Food and Agriculture Project, 1999).  Special fees for
placing branded and bagged vegetable items provide some guides as to the possible costs of placing credence20
label items in the supply chain, but the types of fees vary widely and data is limited.  However, a recent study
reports slotting fees in the range from one  to eight percent (Calvin, et al., 2001).   Given these data, labeling
costs  were set within a range from zero to five percent, so as to determine the  sensitivity of the simulation
results to modest cost levels. 
The bottom half of Table 2 describes the quantity and price effects of costless and costly labeling.
Labeling performs exactly as anticipated in Theorems 1 and 2. Costless labeling results in a one-thousand ton
increase in the mean aggregate quantity, resulting from a 46-thousand ton mean decrease in conventional
production and a 47-thousand ton mean increase in green production.  At the mean, green market share rises
three point to 24 percent in the separating equilibrium from 21 percent in the pooled equilibrium.  The mean
conventional price is six percent less than the pooled equilibrium and the mean green price is 22 percent greater
in the separating equilibrium than in the pooling equilibrium.  The mean green price premium is 27 percent of
the initial pooling price, consistent with Theorem 2.  The range of price and quantity effects vary with the
parameter values.  For instance, change in the conventional quantity may be almost zero in some cases and over
300 thousand tons in other cases.
Costly labeling differs from costless labeling in two important ways. First, the mean aggregate quantity
in a separating equilibrium is less than that of the pooling equilibrium.  This suggests that the welfare effect
for conventional consumers may be negative, at least at the mean when labeling is costly.  Second, the mean
green and conventional prices in the separating equilibrium with costly labeling are slightly  higher than the
prices in the costless labeling simulations.  Since only green production experiences the direct costs of labeling,
the higher prices for conventional producers may reduce their certain loss. The mean green price increase is
not enough to offset mean labeling costs, so labeling costs reduce green producers surplus.
Table 3 lists the welfare impacts of costless and costly labeling.  The welfare changes were calculated
using the equations of Table 1 for each of the 8,000 simulated equilibria.  The results are reported as the mean
and range for each of the welfare measures.  21
Costless labeling always has a positive welfare impact, but the benefits and costs are highly
asymmetric, especially across production sectors.  The aggregate market mean is a net benefit of $7.4 million
with a range of approximate zero to $83 million.  The mean effects on conventional and green consumers are
$0.6 million and $1.1 million, but the welfare impacts of costless labeling range as low as $-122 million for
conventional consumers and $-82 million for green consumers.  The welfare outcome for conventional
producers is negative, with a mean of $-65 million and a range from $-486 million to a loss of a several
hundred thousand dollars.  Green producers are the certain gainers from labeling, with benefits ranging from
$1 million to $530 million and a mean benefit of almost $71 million.
It is also notable that the naive rules-of-thumb are highly misleading with respect to the welfare
impacts.  Multiplying the pooling equilibrium green quantity times consumer willingness to pay results in a
mean result of $89.5 million.  This is more than 12 times the aggregate market impact of $7.4 million.
Multiplying the pooling equilibrium aggregate quantity time consumer willingness to pay yields an even more
misleading number if interpreted as a ballpark measure of welfare change.
The costly certification simulations included unit labeling costs for green producers that ranged from
zero to five percent of the initial pooling price.  With this modest level of costs, the mean aggregate impact is
negative and the range of aggregate welfare impacts widens to include a significant negative region.  The
pattern of results across the different groups remains similar to costless labeling, but the range of results for
each group becomes slightly more negative.  The results show that even green producers may be worse off in
some costly labeling scenarios.
The pattern of mean results for costly labeling suggests the Spence result; that asymmetric information
can create an incentive for inefficient provision of information (Spence, 1973).  In this case, the mean result
for green producers is clearly positive, while the aggregate mean and the means for other market groups are
clearly negative.  Inspection of individual cases showed that this conflict between positive net benefits in the
green sector and net welfare losses overall occurred in about 60 percent of the simulations with costly labeling.22
Additionally, labeling gives the green production sector routine incentives to realize gains as the
expense of other market groups.  In all cases where the green producer impact is positive, the net impact on
conventional producers and all consumers is negative.  Correlation analsysis suggested that the conflict in
interests was strongest between green and conventional producers, and relatively weak between green producers
and consumers.  The Pearson correlation coefficient for the conventional and green producer impacts was -0.9,
while it was only -0.15 between  green producers and conventional consumers and -0.16 between green
producers and green consumers.
Regression analysis was used to determine how initial conditions affected the aggregate welfare
changes and the welfare changes for market participants.  Table 4 displays the estimated coefficients.  The
dependent variables were the welfare change measures in millions of dollars for the aggregate market and the
market groups.  The independent variables were the variables determining the initial conditions (Table 1)
measured in standard deviation units.  The estimated coefficients therefore express the change in a welfare
measure in millions of dollars given a one standard deviation change in the independent variable. The estimated
coefficients were all significantly different from zero at the 95 percent level, except where noted by a footnote.
   The coefficients show that the conditioning variables do varying significantly in their effects.  A one
standard deviation change in pooled aggregate quantity, green market share, pooled price, or willingness to pay
has large and asymmetric impacts on producers, with conventional producers tending to lose $22 to $30 million
in surplus and green producers gaining $23 to 35 million.  The green and conventional supply elasticities have
the largest impacts on consumers.  An one standard deviation unit increase in conventional supply reduces
conventional consumers welfare by $10 million and green consumer surplus by $4 million.  An increase in the
green supply elasticity has a positive effect on both sets of consumers.  Changes in supply elasticities have
effects on producers that are opposite in sign to their effects on consumers.
Given the conflicts of interest pointed out, it is not surprising that five of the eight independent
variables have effects on aggregate welfare that are opposite in sign to their effects on green producer welfare.23
Pooled aggregate quantity, green market share, and pooled price have a small negative effect on aggregate
welfare and a large positive effect on green producer welfare.  Demand elasticity and green supply elasticity
have small positive effects on aggregate welfare, and green supply elasticity has a small negative effects on
green producer welfare.  The demand elasticity  coefficient for producer surplus is also negative, but not
significantly different from zero at the 90 percent level. 
Labeling with Market Saturation
When market saturation occurs with labeling, consumers are able to match their preferences to the pure
good they prefer, but price is determining by demanders who do not have a willingness to pay for credence
attribute.  The latter consumer group is indifferent between the conventional and green goods.  Hence, price
is equalized across the two markets.  With costless label, green consumers experience a welfare improvement
welfare gain without paying a price premium or a higher price.
  Table 5 lists the welfare consequence of labeling with and without market saturation.  As a point of
reference, the column labeled None lists welfare changes at the mean level of the initial conditions
6 in Table
1, but with no market saturation.  The two other results columns report welfare changes with saturation at five
and ten percent of the pooled aggregate quantity.
   The results for costless certification and labeling highlight the impact of market saturation.  Without
market saturation, conventional producer lose $53.6 million in surplus with labeling while green producers gain
$57.6 million.  The aggregate impact is a net gain of $4 million.  Green and conventional consumer welfare
is unaffected by costless labeling since the equilibrium price and quantity remain unaffected by the green
consumers’  shift in demand.  With market saturation, there are too few green consumers to affect market price.
With market saturation, green consumers gain $13 million, with no welfare costs to conventional consumers,
conventional producers, and green producers.  Costless labeling with market saturation simply allows green
consumers to match their preferences with the appropriate product. 24
Costly labeling changes the results once again, and somewhat paradoxically.  Certification costs
increase supply costs for green producers.  However, with market saturation, no price premium emerges to
compensate for the additional costs.  Green and conventional producers compete at a price determined by
demand for the conventional product.   Higher costs in the green subsector result in a loss of market share for
green producers and a higher price for the conventional and green product.  Conventional producers gain from
the higher price and greater market share.
   Green consumers gain from matching their preferences to the green product, while paying only a
portion of the cost of certification.  Conventional consumers lose due to the increase in price.
As long as market saturation occurs, green consumer welfare rises linearly with the percentage of green
consumers.  Of course, at some point the number of green consumers would reach a point where there is no
market saturation and the equilibrium would shift to one without market saturation.
Conclusion
The analysis developed the theoretical consequences of labeling as well as an applied benefit-cost framework
for policy evaluation.  With respect to credence and conventional producers, labeling has highly asymmetric
consequences.  Without market saturation, credence producers are certain to gain and conventional producers
are certain to lose.  Conventional and green consumers may gain or lose, but by relatively modest amounts that
depend largely on the level of certification costs.  Costless labeling is certain to generate potential Pareto
improvements, but costly labeling may reduce welfare.
   Paradoxically, costless labeling is free of adverse impacts when the market saturation occurs. Market
saturation occurs when credence production exceeds the credence quantity demanded by those consumers who
care about the credence attribute.  With market saturation, certified production is priced at the margin by
consumers who are not willing to pay for the credence characteristics.  A price premium fails to emerge and
those who care about the credence attribute get the credence good at the conventional good price.  The net
welfare effect of labeling is positive as long as certification costs are not too high. 25
 Neither average willingness to pay in excess of average labeling costs, nor anticipated gains to
credence producers, are reliable indicators of potential Pareto improvements. Average willingness to pay is only
one of the factors that determines price and welfare effects. Gains for credence producers do not predict general
efficiency gains.  The net welfare effects of labeling  may be negative even when credence producer surplus
is large and positive.  As in Spence (1973), credence producers may have an interest in inefficient signals.
Furthermore, with market saturation, the net welfare effects of labeling may be positive, even though a price
premium fails to emerge for the credence good and credence producers sustain both a loss of market share and
welfare. 
  Certified labeling can cut deeply into the economic returns of a market subsector.  Net welfare gains
of labeling may be small relative to gross gains and losses.  When sizable gains and losses are likely to occur,
compensatory strategies may be appropriate.   Informational strategies other than labeling  may prove to be
more benign.  For instance, if consumer conjectures are incorrect, a market-level information policy about the
level of credence attribute in the pooled market may reduce deadweight loss without disrupting returns to
producers.
7 
The results suggest a pragmatic and cautious approach to certified labeling proposals in agricultural
markets.   Empirical analysis of labeling’s consequences requires good estimates of the supply and demand
elasticities, in addition to willingness to pay for labeled products.  Moreover, while willingness to pay research
is well established, more clarity is needed on the distribution of willingness to pay across consumers, since
willingness to pay at the margin of price determination is crucial in determining the size and distribution of
welfare gains and losses.26
1. Residual demands are analytically common in analyzing imperfect competition, and the concept also
proves informative in this case of a competitive market with certified labeling.
2. The weighing of surpluses of price, surplus, and opportunity cost appears to be second nature at an
early age.  A California elementary school began sales of organic lunch items, but sales were thin.  The
news report quotes a ten-year old as saying that the organic items are “pretty expensive”, with the
student preferring a complete conventional lunch of a pizza, raisins, carrots, an orange, and chocolate
milk over the single organic enchilada available at the same price (Wong, 2002).
3. To set that the price premium is equal to the willingness to pay premium, note that the willingness to
pay premium is the vertical distance ac.   The vertical distances ab and cd are equal by definition of
the separating equilibrium.  Adding the vertical distance bc to each of the latter results in ab plus bc
and bc plus cd.  Clearly, ab plus bc equals bc plus cd, showing that the price premium, ab plus bc,
equals the price premium, bc plus cd.  
4. Mathematical proofs of the theorems are available upon request to the authors.  Also, unless stated
otherwise, the theorems assume that (a) the conjectured green market share is strictly greater than zero
and less than one and (b) demand and supply functions are inelastic.  Similar theorems may be derived
without the latter two assumptions, but the narrative is complicated by weak inequalities that require
additional explanation.
5. Additional analysis could assume incorrect conjectures, but this would mix the informational
consequences of labeling with the consequences of correcting incorrect conjectures.  Darby and Karni
(1973) consider the issue of incorrect conjectures and develop a distinct deadweight loss measure to
evaluate to the costs of mistaken conjectures.
6. To avoid confusion, we note that the welfare effect of the mean initial conditions in Table  5 is not
equal to the mean welfare effect in Table 3 since the  equilibrium and welfare equations are non-linear
in the initial parameters.
7. See Darby and Karni (1973) for a discussion of deadweight loss in the context of credence goods.
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35, no. 2(2001): 301-347.Table 1: Welfare Differences between the Separating Equilibrium with Certified Labeling and the
Pooling Equilibrium
a
Market Groups Welfare Differences: Surplus in Separating Equilibrium Minus Surplus
in Pooling Equilibrium
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saturation are available upon request to the authors.Table 2.  Initial Conditions and Results for Simulated Separating Equilibria
a
 Market Quantities Mean Standard
Deviation
Range
Initial Market Conditions and Parameters
Aggregate quantity, 1,000 tons 1,655 645 547 to 2,771
Green market share, % 21 11 2 to 40
Price per ton, $ 944 333 364 to 1,514
Demand elasticity -0.7 0.29 -0.2 to -1.2
as percent of pooled price 27.4 13 5 to 50 γ1
Conventional supply elasticity 0.7 0.29 0.2 to 1.2
Green supply elasticity 0.7 0.3 0.2 to 1.2
Certification cost as a percent of price, % 2.5 1.4 0 to 5
Costless certification, separating equilibrium
Aggregate quantity, 1000 tons 1,656 646 537 to 2,839
Change in conventional quantity, 1000 tons -46 42 -318 to ~0
Change in green quantity, 1000 tons 47 44 ~0 to 326 
Green market share, % 24 12 2 to 51
Conventional price per ton, $ 889 317 280 to 1,509
Green price per ton, $ 1,147 419 389 to 2,235
Costly certification, separating equilibrium
Aggregate quantity, 1000 tons 1,653 645 536 to 2,828
Change in conventional quantity, 1000 tons -42 41 -318 to -10
Change in green quantity, 1000 tons 44 41 -5 to 326 
Green market share, % 24 12 2 to 51
Conventional price per ton, $ 892 318 283 to 1,510
Green price per ton, $ 1,150 419 389 to 2,235
a.   The simulations were based on 8,000 sets of parameters drawn from the range of parameters listed
as initial conditions. The costless certification results reset each of the unit cost parameter to zero,
while the costly certification results left unit certification costs at the randomly drawn values. 
Initial quantities and prices were representative of annual data for five largest non-citrus fruit
crops in 2001 (see Economic Research Service, 2003).Table 3.  Welfare Impacts of Costless and Costly Certified Labeling
a
Welfare Change due to Certified Labeling in Millions of Dollars
Welfare Measure Costless Certification Costly Certification
Mean Range Mean Range
Aggregate market 7.4 0 to 83 -1.9 -61.9 to 71.2
Conventional
Consumers 1.1 -122 to 163 -1.9 -133 to 147
Producers -65.0 -486 to ~0 -62.0 -481 to ~0
Green
Consumers 0.6 -82 to 107 -0.8 -88 to 100




g (γ1 & τ) 89.5 1 to 693 81.2 0 to 668
Q p(γ1 & τ) 427.4 16 to 1,972 388.0 1 to 1,893
a.  The welfare measures for costless and costly labeling were based on 8,000 pairs of simulated pooled
and separating equilibria. The initial conditions, price, and quantity results are described Table 2.  The
costless certification results reset each of the unit cost parameter to zero, while the costly certification
results left unit certification costs at the randomly drawn values.Table 4.  Regression of Welfare Impacts of Certified Labeling on Initial Market Conditions
Independent Variables
a
Estimated Coefficients by Dependent Variable in $Millions
b
Conventional Surplus Green Surplus Aggregate
Market
Surplus Consumers Producers Consumers Producers
Pooled aggregate quantity -.8 -24.2 -.3 24.6 -.7
Green market share -1.3 -24.9 -.8 25.3 -1.7





WTP as % of pooled price .4 -30.4 .2 35.1 5.3
Conventional supply elasticity -10.0 10.9 -4.1 4.0 .8
Green supply elasticity 9.0 -8.8 3.7 -1.9 1.9
Certification costs -1.8 2.4 -.8 -5.1 -5.4
Intercept -1.9 -62.0 -.8 62.8 -1.9
R
2 .53 .75 .37 .76 .60
a.  Independent variables were measured as deviations from mean in standard deviation units.
b.  Dependent variables were measured in millions of dollars.
c.  The variable is not significantly different from zero at the 10%Table 5.  Welfare Gains from Certification with Certification Costs and Market Saturation,
Millions of Dollars
Cost Levels and Market Subsector Market Saturation Level
None At 5% At 10%
Costless Certification
Conventional Producers -53.6 0.0 0.0
Conventional Consumers 0 0.0 0.0
Green Producers 57.6 0.0 0.0
Green Consumers 0.0 13.0 25.9
Aggregate 4.0 13.0 25.9
Certification Cost at 5% of Pooled Price
Conventional Producers -47.3 6.5 6.5
Conventional Consumers -6.3 -7.8 -7.4
Green Producers 41.4 -14.5 -14.5
Green Consumers -1.9 12.5 25.1
Aggregate -14.1 3.2 9.8
Certification Cost at 10% of Pooled Price
Conventional Producers -41.0 13.0 13.0
Conventional Consumers -12.7 -15.5 -14.6
Green Producers 25.7 -28.4 -28.4
Green Consumers -3.6 12.1 24.3
Aggregate -31.6 18.8 -5.8
a. When market saturation occurs, the welfare results for conventional producers, conventional
consumers, and green producers do not vary with the level of saturation, only the level of certification
costs.